联合国安全理事会:国际原子能机构总干事格罗西先生呼吁在扎波罗热核电厂建立核安全和核安保保护区

总干事拉斐尔·马里亚诺·格罗西昨天告诉联合国安全理事会,迫切需要在乌克兰扎波罗热核电厂建立一个核安全和核安保保护区,以确保该电厂的物理完整性不受损害。扎波罗热核电厂自3月以来一直被俄罗斯部队控制,但由其乌克兰工作人员运行。 在讨论国际和平与安全威胁的会议上,格罗西先生概述了周二发布的《乌克兰核安全、核安保和核保障:简要报告2》中所载原子能机构对扎波罗热的支持和援助工作组(扎波罗热支援工作组)的调查结果和建议。 他强调有必要建立一个保护区(包括停止该电厂附近的炮击),并解释说,任何核设施的首要安全支柱都是不破坏其物理完整性。格罗西先生说,不幸的是,“这种破坏已经发生,而且还在继续发生。”他又补充道,“我们是在玩火,可能会发生极具灾难性的情况。”

2022年9月6日,原子能机构总干事拉斐尔·马里亚诺·格罗西通过视频连接向联合国安全理事会发表讲话。(照片来源:原子能机构)

总干事拉斐尔·马里亚诺·格罗西昨天告诉联合国安全理事会,迫切需要在乌克兰扎波罗热核电厂建立一个核安全和核安保保护区,以确保该电厂的物理完整性不受损害。扎波罗热核电厂自3月以来一直被俄罗斯部队控制,但由其乌克兰工作人员运行。

在讨论国际和平与安全威胁的会议上,格罗西先生概述了周二发布的《乌克兰核安全、核安保和核保障:简要报告2》中所载原子能机构对扎波罗热的支持和援助工作组(扎波罗热支援工作组)的调查结果和建议。

他强调有必要建立一个保护区(包括停止该电厂附近的炮击),并解释说,任何核设施的首要安全支柱都是不破坏其物理完整性。格罗西先生说,不幸的是,“这种破坏已经发生,而且还在继续发生。”他又补充道,“我们是在玩火,可能会发生极具灾难性的情况。”

格罗西先生告诉安理会,原子能机构通过扎波罗热支援工作组现已在扎波罗热核电厂保持了持续存在,在电厂的现场工作人员可提供有关该厂址状况的第一手中立、公正的技术性资料。他指出了原子能机构在该电厂保持持续存在的重要性,这使原子能机构且由此使联合国和国际社会能够对现场可能发生的情况进行直接、即时的评价。  

格罗西先生说:“这种情况前所未有。”他指出原子能机构视察员历来是在事实发生后才介入,旨在补救已经发生的事情。他说:“而这一次,无论从历史角度,还是从道德角度,我们都必须阻止事情发生。”

他补充说:“我们可以商定一个非常简单、但却极其必要的保护机制,来避免我们讨论之际正在发生的事情,也就是对核电厂的炮击。让我们抓住这个对和平、对安全、对保护乌克兰境内外人民如此重要的机会。”

关于重建核安全和核安保支柱的建议

格罗西先生强调,确保扎波罗热核电厂核安全和核安保的七个不可或缺的支柱必须得到维护,并详细介绍了原子能机构应对这些支柱受损的建议。

格罗西先生解释了扎波罗热支援工作组如何观察到该电厂的运行人员在极具挑战性的情况(厂址上有军事设备和车辆)下执行重要的安全和安保任务。由于支柱2规定所有的安全和安保系统及设备都应处于全面运行状态,总干事建议移除厂址上的军事车辆和设备,以免干扰核安全和核安保系统正常运行。

支柱3要求运行人员必须能够在没有不适当压力的情况下履行其安全和安保职责。格罗西先生说,这是在此次危机中,特别是自3月核电厂被占领以来,一再讨论的问题。  他建议,应让营运者恢复其明确的常规责任和权限,并重新建立适当的工作环境,包括为工作人员提供适当的家庭支持。

格罗西先生强调了支柱4的极端重要性,即必须有由电网提供的安全的厂外电力供应。他说:“核电厂若没有外部电力供应,就有可能失去关键功能,包括反应堆和乏燃料的冷却。若无这一支柱,则可能会发生非常严重的核事故。”他建议应重新部署厂外供电线路冗余,并确保随时可用,然后说,要实现这一点,就“必须立即结束所有可能影响供电系统的军事活动”。

支柱5要求必须有不间断的后勤供应链和往返于场址的运输。格罗西先生谈及此支柱时解释说,扎波罗热核电厂是 “一个大型工业场址,需要不断输送备件和其他设备——当然这一状况现已被非正常中断了”。他建议有关各方应承诺并帮助确保有效的供应链,并强调原子能机构援助和支持计划可以帮助重新建立供应流。

支柱6指辐射监测系统的运行。格罗西先生建议该厂址应继续确保这一功能,包括通过培训和演练。他表示,原子能机构可以助力确保这一点。

最后,格罗西先生重点指出,支柱7规定,必须与监管机构和其他方面保持着可靠的通讯。他说:“我们看到这些通讯线路一再被中断。”他建议在任何时候都要保证可靠且有冗余的通讯手段和渠道。

格罗西先生感谢联合国秘书长对帮助稳定扎波罗热核电厂核安全和核安保局势的扎波罗热支援工作组访问的支持。

Recommendations for re-establishing the pillars of nuclear safety and security

Mr Grossi stressed that the seven indispensable pillars for ensuring nuclear safety and security at Zaporizhzhya NPP must be maintained and detailed the IAEA’s recommendations to address violations of these pillars.

Mr Grossi explained how ISAMZ had observed that operators at the plant were performing important safety and security tasks under extremely challenging circumstances, with military equipment and vehicles present on the site. With the second pillar stating that all safety and security systems and equipment should be fully functional, he recommended that the military vehicles and equipment on the site be removed so as not to interfere with normal operation of the nuclear safety and security systems.

Under the third pillar, which requires operating staff to be able to fulfil their safety and security duties without undue pressures, Mr Grossi said that this is something that has been addressed time and again during this crisis and especially since the nuclear power plant was occupied last March.  He recommended that the operator should be allowed to return to its clear and routine lines of responsibilities and authorities, and that an appropriate work environment be re-established, including with proper family support for the staff.

Mr Grossi stressed the crucial importance of pillar four, which states that there must be secure off-site power supply from the grid, stating that: “A nuclear power plant without external power supply may lose crucial functionalities including the cooling of the reactors and the spent fuel. Without this we could have a very serious nuclear accident.” He recommended that off-site power supply line redundancy be re-established and available at any time, and said that for this to be possible, “all military activities that may affect the power supply systems must be stopped immediately.”

Referring to the fifth pillar, which requires uninterrupted logistical supply chains and transportation to and from the sites, Mr Grossi explained that the Zaporizhzhya NPP is "a large industrial site requiring a constant flow of spare parts and other equipment — a situation that is of course abnormally interrupted now.” He recommended that all the parties should commit and contribute to ensuring effective supply chains, highlighting that IAEA assistance and support programmes can help in re-establishing a flow of supplies.

Pillar six refers to the functioning of radiation monitoring systems, and Mr Grossi recommended that the site should continue ensuring this functionality, including by trainings and exercises, which he said the IAEA can help in ensuring.

Finally, Mr Grossi highlighted that pillar seven states that there must be continued and reliable communications with the regulator and with others. “We have seen repeatedly that these lines of communication have been interrupted,” he said. He recommended that reliable and redundant communication means and channels be secured at all times.

Mr Grossi thanked the United Nations Secretary General for his support in the ISAMZ mission to help stabilize the nuclear safety and security situation at the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant.