Y2K Workshop For IAEA Member States Held

From 12 to 16 July 1999, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) conducted a workshop to assist its Member States on the challenge that the Year 2000 issue (Y2K) presents to operators and regulators of nuclear power plants. Following an earlier workshop in January, at which the IAEA methodology for dealing with Y2K was explained, this workshop was designed to permit an exchange of information on the results of nuclear safety regulatory authorities' and operators' assessments and the remedial measures they had taken. It also addressed the topic of contingency planning for the transition to the Year 2000.
The workshop was attended by 52 participants and lecturers from Armenia, Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Czech Republic, France, Hungary, India, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Republic of Korea, Lithuania, Mexico, Pakistan, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Ukraine, USA and Uzbekistan. Representatives of the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) also attended.
The workshop included plenary sessions dealing with topics such as:
- results of recent IAEA missions to Chernobyl and Bohunice NPPs;
- inventory and prioritization of Y2K susceptible equipment;
- equipment testing and approaches to solving Y2K challenges.
Highlights of the workshop
Reported results give confidence that NPPs are on the way to meet the Y2K-related milestones established by the regulatory bodies.
In most countries, results of regulatory reviews are being documented and reported to the Government. Most final reports are due in the last quarter of 1999.
Regulators stated that they would continue to monitor the impact on licensee Y2K readiness activities. Several said that they have reviewed their own systems and internal contingency plans.
Russia noted that it regularly brings together its NPP operators to exchange experience and that this has proved very valuable.
In general, the Y2K vulnerabilities that have been found through testing and software review have generally not been in control systems but have been found in monitoring and display systems, and data logging.
The operators of Russian-designed RBMK reactors noted that personnel involved in testing were using the internationally accepted critical dates and were not limiting the testing to a simple "rollover" test.
Regarding remediation approaches it was emphasized in the discussions that existing plant work processes, policies and quality assurance should be applied.
Scanning tools, while not 100% effective in detecting all possible Y2K problems, have been used in many nuclear power plants in western countries and have been proven to be very effective.
Of the few problems reported so far, none was found which compromises safety. The main systems identified as not Y2K ready were: Radiation dose measurement systems; Radiation monitoring systems; Personal computers; NPP entrance monitoring systems; Vibration monitoring systems; Spectrometry equipment; Fuel inventory systems; and Office software.
Representatives of NPPs operating in Brazil, China, India, Republic of Korea, Mexico, Pakistan, Romania and Spain exchanged experience in assessment, testing and contingency planning. These countries are moving towards completing their work for Y2K readiness. No safety systems have been found to be affected by Y2K problems.
As was noted in the WWER and RBMK groups, most countries are following the guidance provided by the IAEA or the one developed by the US industry (NEI/NUSMG 97-07), and these guidance documents are generally consistent.
In conclusion, all workshop participants stated that safety remains the top priority for Y2K activities. Specific information provided by the countries and assistance needs will be made available on the IAEA's nuclear safety website NUSAFE.
The IAEA will consider the request from the participating countries for an additional workshop to be organized in autumn 1999 focused on contingency planning. Energy Agency
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