1AEA Board of Governors Holds Spring Meeting, Considers Nuclear Safety Issues and Strengthening of Safeguards Verification System

The Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) devoted its meeting 27-30 March to the consideration of safety-related issues, as well as illicit trafficking of nuclear materials and the safeguards system.

Reviewing the safety experience of 1994, the Board welcomed the absence of events impacting on public health and also the very good safety record of nuclear installations overall. The ongoing efforts of the Agency and others to improve the safety of Soviet-designed reactors were commended.

On illicit trafficking, many Governors reiterated the concern of the international community about such trafficking in nuclear materials and other radioactive sources. Also, several stressed the need for high standards of radiation protection in this context. The Board reiterated that the control and physical protection of nuclear material and other radioactive sources is a national responsibility. In addition, the Board welcomed and gave guidance on the activities of the Agency designed to assist Member States in strengthening their national systems of accounting and control and also the provision of Agency assistance, on request, to Member States in analyzing confiscated nuclear material. The Board endorsed the Secretariat's intention to establish a database on illicit trafficking which would meet both the needs of the Secretariat in carrying out its responsibilities and the need of Member States for reliable information on the extent of the problem.

The Board conducted an initial examination of measures developed under "programme 93+2" for a strengthened cost-effective safeguards system. In this connection, the Board reiterated that the purpose of comprehensive safeguards agreements, where safeguards are applied to all nuclear material in all nuclear activities within the territory of a State party to such an agreement, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, is to verify that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. To this end, the safeguards system for implementing comprehensive safeguards agreements should be designed to provide for verification by the Agency of the correctness and completeness of States' declarations, so that there is credible assurance of the non-diversion of nuclear material from declared activities and the absence of undeclared nuclear activities.

The Board recognized that under comprehensive safeguards agreements the State Parties and the Agency have the obligation to co-operate fully to facilitate implementation of the agreements; furthermore, that a strengthened safeguards system will benefit from technological developments and call for greater access to relevant information and greater physical access to relevant sites for the Agency, either on the basis of existing authority provided for in comprehensive safeguards agreements or on the basis of complementary authority to be conferred by the States involved. The Board noted, however, that some Governors have reservations at this stage about the need for greater access to sites. While not at this stage taking a decision on any of the specific measures proposed, or on their legal basis, the Board endorsed the general direction of "programme 93+2" for a strengthened and cost-effective safeguards.

The Board requested the Secretariat, taking into account the comments made during the discussions and any comments which may still be received from interested Member States, to submit for the Board's consideration at its next meeting in June specific proposals -- for a strengthened and cost-effective safeguards system. In doing so, the Board expressed its understanding that the strengthened safeguards system will respect the principles enunciated in paragraph 4 of the standard guidelines for comprehensive safeguards agreement (INFCIRC/153).*

* Footnote: Paragraph 4 reads as follows:
"The agreement should provide that safeguards shall be implemented in a manner designed:

1. To avoid hampering the economic and technological development of the State or international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including international exchange of nuclear material;
2. To avoid undue interference in the State's peaceful nuclear activities, and in particular in the operation of facilities; and
3. To be consistent with prudent management practices required for the economic and safe conduct of nuclear activities."